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NOTES
SUMMER SCHOOL
The LAw REvIEw is pleased to announce the summer session of
the Law School. For the first time during a summer session, the
Law School is offering a full program of regular work for credit.
The faculty is a strong one and the courses are well selected. It is
to be hoped that advantage will be taken uf the work offered. New
students may begin the study of law-those who are engaged in the
study of law may' accelerate the completion of their course-those
who have completed their course and are engaged in practice may
may carry on work in particular fields of interest. A complete an-
nouncement appears on the outside cover of this issue.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING LEGISLATION
The Supreme Court of the United States, while expressly leaving
for future decision the validity of any particular zoning regulation,
has decided that a general zoning law is constitutional. In the case of
[237]
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' the village council of Euclid,
Ohio, adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan.
The entire municipality was divided into districts in each of which
uniform regulations and restrictions were prescribed governing the
use, area and height of buildings. There were six classes of use
districts, three classes of height districts and four classes of area
districts. Of the use districts, the first class, U-1, was restricted to
single family dwellings, U-2 included two family dwellings, U-3
apartments, hotels, churches, etc., U-4 included offices, retail stores,
theaters, garages, gasoline stations, etc., U-5 factories, repair shops,
advertising signs, etc., and U-6 included cemeteries, junk yards and
other uses not specified. There is a seventh class of uses prohibited
altogether. Enforcement of the ordinance is intrusted to the inspec-
tor of buildings under rules of the Board of Zoning Appeals.
The Ambler Realty Company brought suit to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the zoning ordinance, contending that it violates the Four-
teenth Amendment by depriving the complainant of liberty and prop-
erty without due process of law. The company owned a large tract
of unimproved land on Euclid Avenue which the lower court found
could reasonably be expected to develop into a business section due
to the fact that it was in the path of the industrial development of
the city of Cleveland. By the zoning ordinance, this land was put in
class U-2, restricted to purely residential purposes. As such, it was
greatly lowered in value, the amount of depreciation being estimated
as in the neighborhood of a half million dollars.
On the ground that this amounted to confiscation of property, the
federal district court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional and
enjoined its enforcement. On appeal, this was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court, Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds
and Butler dissenting. As a preliminary matter, the court held that
equitable jurisdiction was clear in this case, as the existence of the
ordinance in effect constitutes a present invasion of the appellee's
' Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company (1926) 47 Sup. Ct. 114, dis-
cussed in 2 U. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 184 (March, 1927), 13 Va. L. Rev. 321
(Feb., 1927), 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 149 (Feb., 1927), 11 Minn. L. Rev. 275
(Feb., 1927), 34 Yale L. J. 427 (Jan., 1927), 13 Am. B. A. Journ. 18 (Jan.,
1927). For general discussions of zoning legislation, see Newman F. Baker,
Constitutionality of Zoning Laws, 20 Ill. L. Rev. 213, 21 111. L. Rev. 284;
Baker, Zoning Legislation, 11 Corn. L. Qt. 164; Bettman, Constitutionality of
Zoning, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 834; Chamberlain and Pierson, Zoning Laws and
Ordinances, 10 A. B. A. Jour. 185; Williams, Law of City Planning and
Zoning.
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property interests and a threat to continue it.2 Mr. Justice Suther-
land, writing the opinion of the court, discusses the history of zoning
legislation, showing its modem origin in this country and giving as a
reason for its spread, the increasing complexity of city life which
calls for constant regulation.
Zoning laws must find their justification in the police power.
Otherwise the deprivation of liberty and property is illegal. How
far the zoning regulation can go depends upon whether the court con-
cludes that the regulation "passes the bounds of reason and assumes
the character of a merely arbitrary fiat."13 A zoning law applicable
to New York City might clearly be invalid if applied to Chapel Hill.
So a law which restricts a particular kind of a building or for a
particular use, like a nuisance, is to be judged in connection with
surrounding circumstances. "A nuisance may be merely the right
thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barn-
yard. If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning pur-
poses be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control." 4
The court recognizes that the crux of the zoning legislation is the
creation and maintenance of residential districts from which business
and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses, are
excluded. The state decisions which broadly sustain such power
of regulation greatly outnumber those which narrowly limit it or
which deny it altogether. 5
'See concurring opinion of Hoke, J., in Turner v. New Bern (1924) 187
N. C. 541, 122 S. E. 469.
'47 Sup. Ct. 114, 119.
'47 Sup. Ct. 114, 118.
'Cases sustaining zoning laws: Gorieb v. Fox (Va,-1926) 134 S. E. 914;
Opinion of Justices (1920) 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525; Inspector of Build-
ings v. Stoklosa (1924) 250 Mass. 52, 145 N. E. 262; State v. New Orleans(1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440; Trust Co. v. Bldg. Corp. (1920) 229 N. Y.
313, 128 N. E. 209; Auroro v. Burns (1925) 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784; State
v. Houghton (1925) 164 Minn. 146, 204 N. W. 569; State v. Harper (1923)
182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451; Ware v. Wichita (1923) 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac.
99; Miller v. Board (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac, 381; Providence v. Steph-
ens (R. I.-1926) 133 Atl. 614.
Contra: Goldman v. Crowther (1925) 147 Md. 282, 128 At. 50; Ignaciunas
v. Risley (1923) 98 N. J. Law 712, 121 Ati. 783; Spann v. City of Dallas (1921)
111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513; Sinith v. Atlanta (1926) 161 Ga. 769, 132 S. E. 66.
In Missouri, the *Supreme Court has decided against a comprehensive zon-
ing ordinance on the ground that it is contrary to the provision of the Mis-
souri Constitution that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation." State ex rel. Penrose Investment Co.
v. McKelvey (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474. L'niting zoning in the same
way as an exercise of the power of eminent domain seems to be clearly
wrong. See Baker, op. cit., 20 Ill. L. Rev. 213, 228.
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Decisions upholding general zoning laws agree that the exclusion
of business and apartment houses from certain residential districts
bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the community,
as it tends to promote health and security from injury of children and
others, aids suppression and prevention of disorder, facilitates fire
prevention and traffic regulation, reduces danger of contagion, makes
the construction and repair of streets easier and less expensive,
increases the security of home life and provides a more favorable
environment for raising children and establishing homes. "If these
reasons . . . do not demonstrate the wisdom or sound policy in
all respects of those restrictions which we have indicated as pertinent
to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude
us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare."
Finally, the opinion indicates that the decision is limited to the
question of this zoning ordinance as a whole. There may be future
cases where the details of the law as applied to particular premises
will prove to be unreasonable and clearly arbitrary. Thus future
cases will involve the reasonableness of any particular application of
zoning regulation. Under the present decision, comprehensive zon-
ing laws are deemed to advance the public welfare and are held to
be valid exercises of the police power.
In North Carolina, the beginning of municipal zoning is seen in
the statute of 1919 authorizing cities and towns to create planning
boards "whose duty it shall be to make a careful study of the
resources, possibilities and needs of the city or town, particularly with
respect to the conditions which may be injurious to the public wel-
fare or otherwise injurious, and to make plans for the development
of the municipality."' 7 This was followed in 1923 by the general
zoning law,8 under which the legislative body of cities and incorpo-
rated towns is authorized to regulate and restrict the height, number
of stories and size of buildings, the percentage of lot that may be
occupied, the location and use of buildings, structures and land for
trade, industry, residence or other purpose. To carry this out, the
municipality may be divided into districts and within each district the
047 Sup. Ct. 114, 121.
SC. S. 2643.
'Pub. Laws, 1923, ch. 250; C. S. (v. 3) 2776, r-aa.
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use of buildings, structures and land may be regulated and restricted.
The statute states the purposes of such regulation: to lessen con-
gestion in streets, to secure safety from fire, to promote health and
general welfare, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent over-
crowding of land, to facilitate provisions for transportation, water,
sewerage, parks, schools, etc. Surely, if the court finds that a parti-
cular zoning law fulfills any or all of these purposes, it should follow
that the zoning regulation in question is a reasonable exercise of
that inherent power of government, broad in its scope, incapable of
definition, flexible in its application, varying with time and place,-
the police power. The statute states what are approved legislative
objects under that power.
Although several North Carolina cities have adopted general zon-
ing ordinances, the Supreme Court has not yet passed on their
validity. However, there are a number of cases involving municipal
regulations of the use of private property which may give us some
light on the larger question. The establishment of fire limits by a
city or town is justified under the general welfare clause9 and is
authorized specifically by statute. 10 Within such fire limits, it shall
be unlawful to erect, alter and repair wooden buildings or structures
or additions thereto." The repair of a roof on a wooden addition to
a brick hotel within the fire limits was forbidden although the roof
was to be covered with tin, a fireproof substance1 2 Incorporated
cities and towns are authorized to pass laws for preventing and abat-
ing nuisances.' 3  Perhaps this is the earliest form of zoning. Cer-
tainly there is a relation between the validity of a zoning ordinance
restricting property to certain uses and the power to regulate nui-
sances. Whether the use of property may be abated as a nuisance or
restricted under a zoning regulation is largely determined in view of
surrounding conditions. Thus the court held that an ordinance pro-
hibiting the keeping of hides, fertilizers, etc. within 400 feet of any
dwelling is not violated unless the keeping is a nuisance to the annoy-
ance of the citizens or injurious to the public health.14 Likewise an
'State v. lohnsorn (1894) 114 N. C. 846, 19 S. E. 599; C. S., s. 2673, 2787,
sub. s. 7.
"C. S. 2746, 2802.
C. S. 2750, 2802.-
'"State v. Lawing (1913) 164 N. C. 492, 80 S. E. 69; also State v. Shan-
nonhouse (1914) 166 N. C. 241, 80 S. E. 881.
" C. S. 2676, 2787# sub. s. 6.
"State v. Beacom Supply Co. (1914) 168 N. C. 101, 82 S. E. 948.
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ordinance was held to be invalid which required that all billboards
should be securely placed and kept at a distance of at least two feet
more from the outer edge of the sidewalk than the height of said bill-
board. The court thought that a billboard might be securely con-
structed without conforming to the ordinance and so would not be
dangerous or a nuisance. 15
But the United States Supreme Court has upheld a city ordinance
which prohibited the erection of billboards in certain residential
districts without first obtaining the consent of the majority of the
property owners within the block where the billboard was to be
placed. 16 The police power was thus extended beyond public health
and safety to the general welfare of the community by promoting
public convenience and general prosperity. A city ordinance pro-
hibiting the construction of mills within certain boundaries was
enjoined until a hearing to determine whether the ordinance was
reasonable under the circumstances. It appeared that the ordinance
was most unreasonable in its operation. Justices Walker and Hoke,
while concurring in the result, wanted it to be understood that they
believed that a municipality, in the exercise of the police power,
could prohibit the erectioh of mills within a defined territory.17
An ordinance is valid which prohibits the erection of a private
hospital within 100 feet of a residence.18 Such a hospital may be
a nuisance and would tend to decrease the value of surrounding pro-
perty. Therefore the ordinance is not unreasonable. Stables may
be prohibited altogether within certain prescribed areas and regulated
within other areas.19  So with dance halls20 and pool rooms.21  In
a recent North Carolina case,22 a municipal ordinance was held
invalid which provided that permits for the erection of gasoline stat-
"SState v. Whitlock (1908) 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123; cf. State v. Staples
(1911) 157 N. C. 637, 73 S. E. 112, where an ordinance was held valid which
prohibited the erection of billboards nearer the ground than 24 inches, except
where erected against a solid wall.
Cusack v. Chicago (1917) 242 U. S. 526. 37 Sup. Ct. 190.
'
1Berger v. Smith (1911) 156 N. C. 323, 72 S. E. 376.
'Lawrence v. Nissen (1917) 173 N. C. 359, 91 S. E. 1036.
"State v. Stowe (1925) 190 N. C. 79, 128 S. E. 481. But an ordinance
prohibiting the building of a stable nearer to the residence of -another than
it is to owner's residence is invalid, as having no uniform standard, State v
Bass (1916) 171 N. C. 780, 87 S. E. 972.
"State v. Van Hook (1921) 182 N. C. 831, 109 S. E. 65.
2Brunswick-Balke Co. v. Mecklenburg (1921) 181 N. C. 386, 107 S. E. 317.
"Bizzell v. Goldsboro (1926) 192 N. C. 348, 135 9. E. 50, Stacy, C. J.,
dissenting.
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tions should not be granted by the building inspector without the
approval of the Board of Aldermen. Such a regulation is arbitrary
and unreasonable. There is no standard which will assure fair and
impartial treatment. The Board of Aldermen could provide that
there should be no gasoline stations in certain districts, but the loca-
tion of such stations in the entire city cannot be left to the untram-
meled discretion of the Board, to grant or refuse as they see fit.23
In Turner v. New Bern,2 4 the ordinance prohibiting lumber yards
in certain residential districts was held to be valid, Clark, C. J. say-
ing: "As to the section protected by this ordinance, not solely for
aesthetic reasons, but by reason of menace from fire and disturbances
by noises incident to the unloading of motor trucks and great barges
by negroes and stevedores, and for the comfort and welfare of the
citizens . . . these were sufficient justification for the ordinance."
The Court holds squarely that a municipality, by virtue of the police
power, may regulate businesses or prohibit buildings which are not
nuisances. This gets away from the earlier North Carolfna cases
which seem to limit the application of particular zoning regulations
to unquestioned nuisances,2 5 in line with the minority of state courts
which give a narrow scope to the exercise of the police power.26
While there is a good deal of talk in the United States Supreme
Court decision about nuisances, still it seems clear that there is no
desire to limit zoning regulations to the prohibition and regulation of
nuisances, unless we are willing to extend our conception of nui-
sances. The police power is broader, extending to all the great
public needs.
In the recent case of Harden v. Raleigh,27 the lower court held
that the general zoning ordinance of Raleigh was constitutional. But
it was found that the plaintiff's property was located in the neighbor-
hood-business zone and therefore that the plaintiff was entitled to
' The leading North Carolina case on this question, which was relied upon
and controls the decision in Bizzell v. Goldsboro, is State v. Tenant (1892) 110
N. C. 609, 14 S. E. 387, where an ordinance was held void which provided
that no person shall erect, add to or change any building without first obtain-
ing permission of the Board of Aldermen. Stacy, C. J., in his dissenting
opinion in the Goldsboro case argued that the discretion of the Board of
Aldermen was not arbitrary but was to be exercised with reason. But the
view of the court is that the ordinance is deficient in failing to provide any
standard, uniform and fair in its application.
" Turner v. New Bern (1924) 187 N. C. 541, 122 S. E. 469.
"State v. Beacom Supply Co., n. 14 supra; State v. Whitlock, n. 15 supra.
" Note 5 supra, cases contra.
"Harden v. Raleigh (1926) 192 N. C. 395, 135 S. E. 151.
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erect a gasoline station on her property. Hence, the appeal by the
City of Raleigh from this finding did not raise the question of con-
stitutionality. It seems likely that the North Carolina Supreme
Court would uphold a general zoning ordinance in line with the more
numerous and better reasoned state decisions2" and the recent holding
of the United States Supreme Court.29 In any case which may arise,
the fundamental problem will be whether the particular zoning
regulation is a reasonable exercise of the police power.
R. H. WETTACH.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-KANSAS INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT-
RIGHT TO STRIKE
In 1920 the legislature of Kansas, composed largely of men with
agricultural and non industrial interests, passed the Court of Indus-
trial Relations Act.1 This act was designed to secure continuity of
production in certain essential industries and to that end government
regulati6n was substituted for the usual conflict between capital and
labor.
The legislators were more interested in protecting the dominant
agricultural public than in safe-guarding the customary interests of
capital and labor. The doctrine of Munn v. Illinois2 was extended
by the act beyond the limits set by the courts upon this doctrine.
The manufacture or preparation of food products, the manufacture
of clothing, the production of fuel, the transportation of these com-
modities, and all public utilities were declared to be affected with a
public interest and subject to public regulation. A Court of Indus-
trial Relations was established with extensive powers to investigate
and settle industrial controversies. The court was given authority
to order such reasonable changes in the conduct of the specified
industries in the matters of working and living conditions, hours of
labor, rules and practices, and wages as were necessary to secure
continuity of production. In effect strikes were prohibited. Section
19 of the Act made it a felony for an employer or a trade union
officer in the industries named to wilfully use the power of their
positions to influence another person to violate any provision of the
act. The radical nature of the legislation was appreciated by the
" Note 5 supra.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., n. 1 supra.
1 Kansas Special Sess. Laws, 1920, c. 29.
2Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
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law makers, and they anticipated a struggle in the courts by provid-
ing in Section 28 that if any section of the act were found invalid
by the courts it should be presumed that the act would have been
passed without this section.
Both capital and labor advanced the argument that the act de-
prived them of their rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the constitution. Labor objected that its right to strike was taken
away, capital that its property rights were unreasonably interfered
with.
The question of constitutionality was first raised by the Kansas
miners. In February, 1921 the union officials, led by Howat, presi-
dent, and Dorchy, vice-president, called a strike against the Mackie
Fuel Co. which operated in Kansas. A contract between the company
and the union provided that employees under 19 shoud be paid $3.65
a day, and those over 19, $5 a day. Mishmash, an employee of the
company, had been paid at the lower rate from August 31, 1917, to
March 22, 1918, without protest. At the latter date he demanded
back pay at the $5 rate from August 31, 1917 on the grounds that
he had been born August 31, 1898. The company disputed this
claim. It was shown that the employee's family bible recorded his
birth under two dates, August 31, 1898 and August 31, 1899. After
the dispute had gone unsettled for nearly two years a strike was
ordered to compel the payment of the claim although at the time
Mishmash had left the employ of the company.
Howat had been enjoined from calling a strike in the mining
industry, and his first conviction was for contempt of court because
of his violation of the injunction. He appealed to the Kansas
Supreme Court which sustained the judgment.3 Although not neces-
sary to the decision the court took occasion to uphold the constitu-
tionality of the Industrial Court Act. This decision was appealed
to the U. S. Supreme Court where it was sustained.4 The question
of whether the act was unconstitutional was not passed upon by the
court as they held that this issue was not before them for decision.
Howat and Dorchy were then prosecuted under section 19 of the
act for calling the strike. They were convicted. The Kansas Su-
preme Court, in affirming the sentence, held that the conviction under
section 19 was not a violation of constitutional rights. 5 In an appeal
'State ex rel. Hopkins, Atty. Gen. et al. v. Howat et al (1921) 109 Kans.
376, 198 Pac. 686.
'Howat v. Kansas (1922) 258 U. S. 181, 66 L. Ed. 550.
'State v. Dorchy (1922) 112 Kans. 235, 210 Pac. 352.
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to the U. S. Supreme Court, Dorchy contended that section 19 of
the Act was void because it prohibited strikes and that to do so was
a denial of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
A few months before Dorchy appealed, the U. S. Supreme Court
in The Wolff Packing Company v. The Court of Ind. Relations6
had decided that the Industrial Court Act, in so far as it permitted
the fixing of wages in appellant's packing house, was a deprivation
of appellant's property and liberty of contract without due process
of law. This decision definitely restricted the powers of the Indus-
trial Court to regulate industry. As far as the manufacturing inter-
ests of Kansas were concerned they had been saved from the radical
social legislation of the State Legislature by the conservative policy
of the U. S. Supreme Court. It now remained for the courts to
determine the status of organized labor under the act. In view of
the Wolff Packing Co. case the judgment against Dorchy was
reversed and the case remanded for the state court to determine
whether section 19 was severable from the act so that it might stand
disassociated from the provisions held unconstitutional. Subse-
quently, the Kansas court held that section 19 was to be regarded
as having the legal effect of an independent statute making it a
punishable offence for an officer of a labor union to call a strike of
coal miners thereby suspending production of coal. The judg-
ment of the district court holding Dorchy guilty of violating section
19 was re-affirmed. 8
Dorchy again appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court which in a
recent opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Brandeis has affirmed the
conviction.9 The question before the court was whether section 19
of the Industrial Court Act was constitutional. But the court did
not undertake to decide whether the legislature could prohibit strikes.
It confined itself to a consideration of whether the denial of the
right to call a strike in this case was a violation of the rights of the
appellant under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court says that
there is no absolute right to strike. Sihce a strike is an interference
with the right to carry on business and results in damage to the
employer, the union must be justified in calling it or stand the legal
" Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1922) 262 U. S. 522,
67 L. Ed. 1103.
TDorchy v. Kansas (1923) 264 U. S. 286, 68 L. Ed. 686.
"State v. Howat et al (1924) 116 Kans. 412, 227 Pac. 752.
'Dorchy v. State of Kansas (1926) 47 S. Ct. 86.
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consequences. If the strike is justified and is conducted properly,
the resulting loss to the employer is not actionable. The law recog-
nizes the clash of interests between capital and labor and will not act
to save one party from damage by the acts of the other as long as
those acts are not unlawful in themselves and are the result of
justifiable motives.
The opinion sets forth several causes of industrial disputes which
are suggestive of what the Court considers justifiable grounds for
striking. "There had been no controversy between the company
and the union over wages, hours, or conditions of labor; over dis-
cipline or the discharge of an employee; concerning the observance
of rules; or over the employment of non-union labor. Nor was the
strike ordered as a sympathetic one in aid of others engaged in any
such controversy." The purpose of the strike against the Mackie
Fuel Co. was to secure none of these things. It was simply to impose
a claim long out of date, and, in effect, it amounted to coercion of
the company. The Court held that the Legislature of Kansas acted
within its powers in making an officer of a trade union criminally
liable for calling such a strike, and consequently Dorchy was not
deprived of his constitutional rights by section 19.
If Dorchy had been convicted tinder section 19 for calling a strike
for a justifiable purpose it is probable that the U. S. Supreme Court
would have declared the law unconstitutional as depriving him of his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It would seem, if the
ideas of Mr. Justice Brandeis are generally held by the other justices,
that section 19 is valid only in so far as it punishes acts that already
are illegal and actionable at common law.
In specifically denying the right of the state to regulate wages
and hours10 in certain vital industries, and now by implication deny-
ing the right to prohibit justifiable strikes, the U. S. Supreme Court
has effectively defeated the efforts of the Kansas legislators to
provide for industrial peace.
The unusual circumstance in the Industrial Court litigation is the
alignment of labor with capital in an appeal to the courts for the
protection of constitutional rights. Traditionally the courts have
checked the efforts of legislatures to advance the interests of labor
at the expense of capital. Labor has learned that judicial review of
"
0In Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court (1924) 267 U. S. 552, the
Industrial Court Act was found unconstitutional in so far as it provided for
fixing hours of labor in the meat packing industry.
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social legislation has been at the expense of its ambitions. But in
Kansas, labor found a legislative body whose efforts to protect the
public no more coincided with labor's aims and ideals than with
capital's. Consequently in the Industrial Court cases, labor is found
at one with capital in an appeal to the courts for the protection of
cherished rights against the encroachment of the Kansas Legislature.
School of Commerce, THOMAS W. HOLLAND.
University of North Carolina.
NEGLIGENCE-RULES OF THE ROAD IN MEETING AND PASSING
In the recent North Carolina case of Dreher v. Divine' the
plaintiff brought an action for damages to his automobile caused by
defendant's failure to yield the road in order to allow plaintiff's
automobile to pass on the left from the rear as required by statute.
The court held that defendant owed no duty to keep a look-out for
traffic approaching from the rear and that he was not required to
turn out until seasonable notice of the desire to pass had been given
and conditions rendered passing reasonably safe. Judgment for the
defendant was affirmed.
The statute upon which the plaintiff based his right to recover
is in part as follows: "Any person so operating a motor vehicle
shall on overtaking any such horse, draft animal, or other vehicle,
pass on the left side thereof, and the rider or driver of such horse,
draft animal, or other vehicle shall, as soon as practicable turn to
the right so as to allow free passage on the left."
2
Although the statute deals with motor vehicles, the provisions
are very general, requiring only that the approaching driver shall
pass to the left and that the driver in front shall turn to the right.
There is no provision for signal by the approaching driver, nor does
it clearly provide when it becomes the duty of the driver ahead to
turn to the right to allow those approaching from the rear to pass.
Must he turn to the right when approached from the rear? If so,
it is his duty to know of the approach of vehicles from the rear.
The court in deciding the principal case applied the statute only in
a general way and used the principles of negligence as laid down by
many jurisdictions to decide the specific phases.
1Dreher v. Divine (1926) 192 N. C. 325, 135 S. E. 29.
2 C. S. 2617.
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The law of the road is a set of rules for the protection of the
rights of all who travel upon the highways, regardless of the nature
of the vehicles or the speed at which they travel. Common law prin-
ciples of negligence are used in framing statutes to regulate modem
traffic conditions, but since new situations are constantly develop-
ing, it is clear that statutory rules may be insufficient and that
recourse to common law principles is necessary. There are two
chief divisions of the rules of the road as laid down by statutes
and judicial decisions: (1) rules which must be observed by drivers
going in the same direction when it becomes necessary or desirable
for one to pass the other, and (2) those which must be observed
by drivers going in opposite directions to prevent collisions and
obstruction of the highways.
1. A driver whd is traveling along the highway has the duty
of due care in the use of the road, but does not have to maintain
a look-out for traffic from the rear.3 When one driver approaches
another from the rear he is required to use due care under the cir-
cumstances in any attempt to pass, 4 and, where the driver ahead is
not otherwise apprised of the desire to pass, the driver wishing to
pass must give a signal indicating his desire.5 Where such signal is
given, the driver in front is not required to turn to the right if
there is sufficient space on the left to permit the approaching driver
to pass ;8 but where the road is wide enough to allow passage only
by his turning to the right he is required to do so when he has heard
the signal." Before the rear driver attempts to pass he must by
request, or "equivalent notice," acquaint the driver ahead of his
intention to pass; and he must be reasonably assured that the driver
ahead heard the request, and has accorded him right of way.8
Where a driver upon request refuses to yield the road it is the duty
of the driver approaching from the rear to bring his machine to a
full stop if necessary to avoid a collision. 9 Under exceptional cir-
cumstances it may become the duty of the forward driver to stop
'Strever v. Woodard (1913) 160 Iowa 332, 141 N. W. 931; Delfs v. Dunshee
(1909) 143 Iowa 381, 122 N. V. 236.
'Moore v. Hart (1916) 171 Ky. 725, 188 S. W. 861.
'Dunkelbeck v. Meyer (1918) 140 Minn. 283, 167 N. W. 1034; Young v.
Cowden (1897) 98 Tenn. 577, 40 S. W. 1088.
'Savoy v. McLeod (1913) 111 Me. 234, 88 AtI. 721.
'Dunkelbeck v. Meyer (1918) 140 Minn. 283, 167 N. W. 1034.
'Lumber Co. v. Ollinger (1922) 18 Ala. App. 518, 94 So. 177.
'Ware v. Saufley (1922) 194 Ky. 53, 237 S. W. 1060.
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in order to permit the driver of a faster vehicle to pass from the
rear,10 but under ordinary circumstances no such duty exists. The
highway must be protected, and a driver who approaches from the
rear must use due care. When by failure to do so he inflicts an
injury upon another who was not guilty of contributory negligence
he is liable for the damages caused by the breach of this common-
law duty."
2. Custom and statutes have made it a rule in all of the United
States that persons traveling in opposite directions must pass on
the right. Each is entitled to half the road under ordinary circum-
stances, but there may be conditions which may require a driver to
yield more than half the road, or justify him in yielding less than
half. The law of the road does not require a traveler to keep
always to the right while using the road. He may use any part
theieof that suits his convenience, but upon meeting and passing it
is his duty to keep to the right,12 and failure to turn to the right
has been held negligence.' 3 The mere fact that a driver is driving
to the right of the center of the highway does not relieve him of
the duty of exercising due care to avoid collisions. 4
The driver of an automobile has the right to presume that an
automobile coming from the opposite direction will keep to the
right as required by the rules of the road,1' but there may be cir-
cumstances under which the exercise of due care to protect the
life and property of others may require a driver to go to the left
in order to avoid a collision.16 Where a driver reasonably believes
that a collision can be avoided by his turning to the left he is re-
quired to do so, notwithstanding a statute requiring him to keep to
the right.17 Such situations have given rise to differences of opinion
in several jurisdictions. For example: A, who was driving to the
right of the center of the road, was approached by B, who was driv-
ing to the left of the center. A believed that by turning to the left
a collision could be avoided. A turned to the left and at the same
"Mark v. Fritsch (1909) 195 N. Y. 282, 88 N. E. 38.
'Potter v. Glarsell (1920) 146 La. 687, 83 So. 898.
" Sims v. Eleager (1921) 116 S. C. 41, 106 S. E. 854.
' Goodrich v. Matthews (1919) 177 N. C. 198, 98 S. E. 529.
", Walker v. Lee (1921) 115 S. C. 495, 106 S. E. 682.
' C. S. 2617. Johni v. Pierce (1920) 172 Wis. 44, 178 N. W. 297.
"Kinq v. Holliday (1921) 116 S. C. 463, 108 S. E. 18.
' Walker v. Lee (1921) 115 S. C. 495, 106 S. E. 682.
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time B turned to the right to allow free passage on his left, and
collided with A, who was on the left of the center of the road.
What rights have the parties? Some jurisdictions hold that A as
a reasonably prudent man was forced by the negligence of B to
turn to the left, and, in so doing, he was not negligent and should
be allowed to recover.18 Other courts hold that the accident was
caused by the mistaken belief of an excited driver that the approach-
ing driver did not intend to yield the road, and that his act in
turning across the road was negligent and he cannot recover.19
When a driver overtakes another on a hill and attempts to pass,
and, in doing so, collides with an automobile coming from the oppo-
site direction, the driver so attempting to pass is held liable on the
theory that he should have made the attempt to pass only when it
was safefor him to do so. He was negligent in attempting to pa~s
when he could not see enough road clear for a safe passage.2 0 The
same principle is involved where a driver attempts to pass another
on a curve. He must not place himself in such a position as to be
unable to yield the road to one coming from the opposite direction.
The following case presents an unusual situation: D was driv-
ing in front of P, who blew his horn as a signal that he intended
to pass. D did not hear the signal, but pulled to the right prepara-
tory to making a left turn at an intersection. P believed D had
accorded him the right of way and attempted to pass. D suddenly
turned to the left at the intersection and a collision occurred. The
court held that neither party could recover, that D owed no duty
to P to indicate that he intended to turn left when he had not
heard P's signal, and that P was justified in acting upon the assump-
tion that D had heard the signal and yielded the right of way.2 '
J. C. KEsLER.
'Hubbard v. Bartholomew (1913) 163 Iowa 58, 144 N. W. 13; Molin v.
Wark (1911) 113 Minn. 190, 129 N. W. 383.
" Lloyd v. Calhoun (1914) 82 Wash. 35, 143 Pac. 458; Cupples Mfg. Co. v.
Bow (1920) 32 Idaho 774, 189 Pac. 48.
" 183 App. Div. (N. Y.) 816.
'Lumber Co. v. Ollinger (1922) 18 Ala. App. 518, 94 So. 177.
